Blissful Ignorance: A Motivated Cognition Perspective on Information Avoidance
Abstract
Extant models of willful ignorance—defined as the intentional choice not to seek or use information—typically invoke varying sets of underlying motives. In contrast, we treat willful ignorance as a case of epistemic behavior explained by a broader model of belief formation: the Epistemic Motivation Model. We argue that information avoidance stems from two overarching epistemic motivations: the need for specific certainty (a directional motive) and the need for non-specific certainty (a non-directional motive). Under certain conditions, these motivations may lead individuals to intentionally avoid or suppress information. We believe this approach offers conceptual clarity by embedding information avoidance within belief formation processes, offering a unified framework that generates novel insights and testable hypotheses.
Related articles
Related articles are currently not available for this article.